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Seaman Status: The Supreme Court Recharts Its Course:
Wilander and Gizoni
Eileen R. Madrid*
"Ode to Seaman's Status"
"When I grow up I'll go to sea
And when I'm hurt I'll sue in admiralty
If I win I know I'll be
A rich ole salt, don't you see."
But now they've changed the question
It all began with Robison
And when it's all done
They gave seaman's status to anyone.
For there's Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil
Now, I'll never have to leave the soil
A seaman's not known for his toil
Because there's retained status from Pfeifer Oil.
I've got a raft and I've got a scow
And though I've never swabbed a bow,
Higginbotham's fleet rule shows me how
I can get seaman's status right now.'
INTRODUCTION
The recent unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court
in McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander2 resolved the longstanding
Copyright 1991, by LOUiSLNA LAW REvmw.
Member, Louisiana State Bar Association.
1. This epigram is taken from "Post-Higginbotham Analysis of Seaman's Status"
by Gary Butler, presented to Maritime Personal Injury Seminar, South Texas College of
Law, Summer 1981. See Offshore Company v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959);
Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978); Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361
U.S. 129, 80 S. Ct. 247 (1959). Some of the confusing case law on seaman status which
prompted this epigram will be eliminated by the United States Supreme Court decision
in McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, Ill S. Ct. 807 (1991); and the future ruling in
Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Ill S.
Ct. 1071 (1991).
2. 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991).
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conflict between the Fifth Circuit,3 on the one hand, and the Third 4
Seventh,' and Ninth6 Circuits, on the other hand, with respect to the
legal standard for determining Jones Act 7 seaman status. The Supreme
3. The Fifth Circuit first synthesized its seaman status test in Offshore Company
v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959). Twenty-six years later, a divided Fifth
Circuit sat en banc and reaffirmed its Robison test with some modifications in Barrett
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The Fifth
Circuit's Robison seaman status test states:
there is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go to the jury: (1) if there
is evidence that the injured workman was assigned permanently to a vessel
(including special purpose structures not usually employed as a means of transport
by water but designed to float on water) or performed a substantial part of
his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in which he was employed or
the duties which he performed contributed to the function of the vessel or to
the accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation or welfare of the vessel
in terms of its maintenance during its movement or during anchorage for its
future trips.
266 F.2d at 779. The First and Eighth Circuits have also relied on the Robison test. See,
e.g., Bennett v. Perini Corp., 510 F.2d 114, 115 (1st Cir. 1975); Slatton v. Martin K.
Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931, 95 S.
Ct. 1659 (1975); Stafford v. Perini Corp., 475 F.2d 507, 510 (1st Cir. 1973).
4. The Third Circuit had followed the more traditional tripartite seaman status test
originally enunciated by the First Circuit in Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d
991, 995 (1st Cir. 1941). That test requires "that the ship be in navigation; that there
be a more or less permanent connection with the ship; and that the worker be aboard
primarily to aid in navigation." Id. at 995. E.g., Simko v. C&C Marine Maintenance
Co., 594 F.2d 960, 964 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S. Ct. 64 (1979);
Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054, 96 S. Ct. 785 (1976). Before Robison, the Fifth Circuit had originally
adopted this test in McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1953),
and continued to use it sporadically after Robison. See Bertrand v. International Mooring
& Marine, Inc., 700 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S.
Ct. 974 (1984); McDermott, Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1982).
5. The Seventh Circuit had formulated its seaman status test in Johnson v. John
F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211,
105 S. Ct. 1180 (1985).
6. The Ninth Circuit had also retained the traditional tripartite "aid in navigation"
test set out supra note 4. Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 1071 (1991); Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Services,
Inc., 709 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1983); Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1973).
7. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988), in pertinent part provides:
Section 688. Recovery for injury to or death of seaman
(a) Application of railway employee statutes; jurisdiction.
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all 'statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in case of death of any seaman as a result of any
such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain
1150 [Vol. 51
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Court expressly approved the second prong of the Fifth Circuit's seaman
status test formulated in Offshore Company v. Robison,8 which confers
seaman status on all workers: (1) who are more or less permanently
assigned to a vessel or who perform a substantial portion of their work
aboard a vessel and (2) whose duties contribute to the function or
mission of the vessel.9 In Wilander, the Supreme Court flatly rejected
the notion that a maritime worker must "aid in the navigation of the
vessel" in order to attain Jones Act seaman status and affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's ruling which upheld a jury finding of Jones Act seaman
status in respect of a paint foreman employed by McDermott in the
Persian Gulf.
In this ruling, the Supreme Court turns away from distinctions based
on the employee's particular job or the nature of his duties and focuses
instead on the employee's connection to a vessel in navigation. Although
the Jones Act grants "any seaman" an action for damages at law for
personal injuries sustained in the course of his employment, the Jones
Act does not define the term "seaman." In Wilander, the Court stated,
"[w]e believe the better rule is to define 'master or member of a crew'
under the LHWCA, and therefore 'seaman' under the Jones Act, solely
in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in navigation."' 0
Wilander further stated that:
The key to seaman status is employment-related connection to
a vessel in navigation. We are not called upon here to define
this connection in all details, but we hold that a necessary
element of the connection is that a seaman perform the work
of a vessel. (citation omitted)." In this regard, we believe the
requirement that an employee's duties must "contribut[e] to the
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission '"'
captures well an important requirement of seaman status. It is
an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, ard in such action
all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the rilfht of action for
death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located.
8. 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
9. Id. at 779. See supra note 3.
10. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, III S. Ct. 807, 817 (1991).
Ii. Id. (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 94 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1938)
for the statement "There is implied a definite and permanent connection with the vessel,
an obligation to forward her enterprise."). It is interesting to note that in describing the
type of vessel connection characteristic of seaman status, the Court relies on a pre-Robison
decision.
12. (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959)).
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not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or contribute to
the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing
the ship's work."3
The Wilander decision rests on the legislative chronology of the
Jones Act, passed in 1920, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act,"' a compensation scheme for harbor workers passed
in 1927, which eliminated Jones Act benefits for land-based maritime
workers and harbor workers" and substituted a compensation remedy
for those workers. In that respect, this decision represents a different
analytical approach to seaman status than the oft-cited maxim that the
Jones Act is remedial legislation which should be liberally construed so
as to achieve maximum coverage in order to accomplish beneficent
purposes.1 6 The decision in Wilander may appear to give lip-service to
this maxim in the statement: "All who work at sea in the service of a
13. Wilander, I11 S. Ct. at 817.
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988) [hereinafter LHWCA].
15. The LHWCA covers maritime workers, and, at Section 902(3), defines maritime
"employee" as:
When used in this chapter-
(3) The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker,
but such term does not include-
(A) individuals employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial,
security, or data processing work;
(B) individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational operation, res-
taurant, museum, or retail outlet;
(C) individuals employed by a marina and who are not engaged in
construction, replacement, or expansion of such marina (except for routine
maintenance);
(D) individuals who (i) are employed by suppliers, transporters, or vendors,
(ii) are temporarily doing business on the premises of an employer de-
scribed in paragraph (4), and (iii) are not engaged in work normally
performed by employees of that employer under this chapter;
(E) aquaculture workers;
(F) individuals employed to build, repair, or dismantle any recreational
vessel under sixty-five feet in length;
(G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel; or
(H) any person engaged by a master to load or unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net;
if individuals described in clauses (A) through (F) are subject to coverage under
a State workers' compensation law.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988).
16. See Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 75 S. Ct. 242 (1955); Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 69 S. Ct. 1317 (1949); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246 (1942); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424, 59 S. Ct. 262 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. I10, 56 S. Ct. 707 (1936);
The James H. Shrigley, 50 F. 287, 287-88 (N.D. N.Y. 1892).
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ship face those particular perils to which the protection of maritime
law, statutory as well as decisional, is directed."'' 7 However, the ruling
rests entirely on statutory construction and legislative intent rather than
on jurisprudential policy considerations. The Court clearly declared that
the definition of seaman status, and hence Jones Act coverage, is "found
in the plain language 'master or member of a crew of any vessel"".'8
in the LHWCA. Indeed, when reviewing its earlier decisions, the Court
expressly noted that the holding in Warner v. Goltra'9 that the master
of a vessel is a "seaman" under the Jones Act need not have relied
on the salutary principle that the Jones Act is remedial legislation, and
that the Court's policy analysis in that case "was unnecessary," because
Jones Act coverage is defined "in the plain language of" the LHWCA.0
The Court's focus, therefore, has shifted to defining Jones Act
seaman status in terms of the express LHWCA provisions and in ac-
cordance with the underlying congressional policy of treating land-based
maritime workers, who may face some maritime perils, similarly to other
land-based workers by providing a compensation remedy like that pro-
vided under state statutes. In fact, the LHWCA itself is remedial leg-
islation coverage which is to be broadly construed in accordance with
the express statutory provisions.'
Not only does this decision resolve the longstanding conflict between
the circuits, but the Wilander decision also establishes an important
guideline for determining the proper legal standard for seaman status
under the Jones Act-whether the maritime worker is land-based or sea-
based. This pivotal factor is derived from an analysis of the historical
interaction of the Jones Act and the LHWCA, from which seaman
status evolved.2 2 Having given this guideline to seaman status under the
Jones Act, the Supreme Court again leaves the precise legal definition
to be refined in future cases.23
17. Wilander, 11l S. Ct. at 817.
18. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 814, citing 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(g) (1988).
19. 293 U.S. 155, 55 S. Ct. 46 (1934).
20. Wilander, III S. Ct. at 814.
21. Director, O.W.C.P. v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 316-18, 103
S. Ct. 634, 647 (1983); Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268,
97 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1977); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 74 S. Ct. 88 (1953); McDermott,
Inc. v. Boudreaux, 679 F.2d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 1982). Also, the LHWCA itself creates
a statutory presumption in favor of LHWCA coverage in 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1988) which
requires that "it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary-
(a) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter."
22. An exhaustive and authoritative study of the legislative and jurisprudential de-
velopment of the Jones Act and the LHWCA is set out in Engerrand and Bale, Seaman
Status Reconsidered, 24 S. Tex. L.J. 431 (1983). See also, Engerrand, Seaman Status
Reconstructed, 32 S. Tex. L. Rev. 169 (1991).
23. A significant refinement is expected in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, cert.
granted, Ill S. Ct. 1071 (1991). See infra text accompanying notes 85-94.
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CASE BACKGROUND IN WILANDER
The plaintiff, Jon Wilander, was employed by McDermott Inter-
national, Inc. (McDermott) as a paint foreman supervising the sand-
blasting and painting of fixed drilling platforms located in the Persian
Gulf. Although assigned to the M/V Gates Tide, a "paint boat" char-
tered to McDermott, at the time of his accident, Wilander was not on
the paint boat but was inspecting a pipe on a fixed drilling platform
when a plug on a pressurized pipe exploded and struck him in the head.
Wilander filed suit against McDermott alleging he was a seaman
within the coverage of the Jones Act. Prior to trial, McDermott filed
a motion for summary judgment on the issue of Wilander's status as
a seaman, and in opposition to McDermott's motion, Wilander filed an
affidavit stating that during his employment with McDermott he spent
approximately 70% of his work time "aboard some vessel.
' '24
The trial court denied McDermott's motion for summary judgment
on seaman status, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to present
the seaman status question to the jury. The court elected to sever the
seaman status issue from liability and damages and bifurcated the trial
so that the seaman status issue would be tried to the jury first, followed
by a later trial on liability and damages under the Jones Act.
Although the Supreme Court decision simply stated that Wilander
was assigned to the M/V Gates Tide, an American flag paint boat
chartered to McDermott and outfitted with equipment used in sand-
blasting and painting the fixed platforms, a review of the Fifth Circuit
opinion reveals that the issues and factual findings concerning Wilander's
vessel connection were not so simple. Whereas the Supreme Court opin-
ion stated only that "[b]y special interrogatory, the jury found that
Wilander was either permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial
amount of work aboard, the GATES TIDE .... ,"21 the Fifth Circuit
described the jury's findings on vessel-connection in the following lan-
guage:
Following the first part of the trial the jury found that the
plaintiff had status as a seaman because he was substantially
connected to 1) the DB-9, a Panamanian vessel owned by the
defendant; 2) the GATES TIDE, an American vessel chartered
to the defendant; 3) the fixed platform upon which he was
injured, and 4) a group of vessels called the "TIDEX" fleet.
The jury further found that the plaintiff contributed to the
function of the DB-9 and the GATES TIDE.26
24. Wilander v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 887 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd, III
S. Ct. 807 (1991).
25. Wilander, II1 S. Ct. at 809 (1991).
26. Wilander, 887 F.2d at 89.
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In fact, the trial jury answered seven special interrogatories on the
Jones Act seaman status issues.27 For the purposes of this discussion,
it is sufficient to state that the jury found that Wilander was either
permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial amount of work
aboard the vessel, GATES TIDE, and that the duties which Mr. Wilander
performed contributed to the function of the GATES TIDE's regular
operation or to the accomplishment of its mission.
Having determined Jones Act coverage on this basis, the case then
proceeded to trial on liability and damages, and the jury rendered a
net award of $337,500.00.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, in addition to asking the Fifth
Circuit to reject its Robison test and adopt the more stringent standard
27. The actual jury interrogatories and answers were as follows:
Special Interrogatories to the Jury
1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Wilander was
either permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial amount of work
aboard the vessel, GATES TIDE?
Answer Yes or No Yes
2. If your answer to question number I is "No" please proceed to question
number 3. If you answered "Yes" to question i, please answer the following
question: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the duties
which Mr. Wilander performed contributed to the function of the GATES TIDE's
regular operation or to the accomplishment of its mission?
Answer Yes or No Yes
3. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Wilander was
either permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial amount of work
aboard vessels belonging to the TIDEX fleet other than the GATES TIDE?
Answer Yes or No Yes
4. If your answer to question number 3 is "No" please proceed to question
number 5. If you answered "Yes" to question number 3 please answer the
following question: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
duties which Mr. Wilander performed contributed to the function of the vessels
in the TIDEX fleet or to the accomplishment of their mission?
Answer Yes or No No
5. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Wilander was
either permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial amount of work
aboard, the barge DB-9?
Answer Yes or No Yes
6. If your answer to question number 5 is "No" please proceed to question
number 7. If you answered "Yes" to question 5, please answer the following
question: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the duties
which Mr. Wilander performed contributed to the function of the barge DB-
9's regular operation or to the accomplishment of its mission?
Answer Yes or No Yes
7. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Wilander was
either permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial amount of work
aboard, the fixed platform?
Answer Yes or No- Yes
11551991]
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used by the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction
Co.,28 McDermott contended that the trial court should have denied
seaman status as a matter of law, and alternatively, that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding on seaman status.
Under the Seventh Circuit's Johnson test, seaman status is conferred
only on employees who "perform significant navigational functions or
further the transportation function of the vessel," and as a matter of
law, Wilander would not there have qualified for seaman status.
Adhering to its decision in Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ,29 which
reaffirmed the validity of the Robison test, the Fifth Circuit panel
affirmed, finding "sufficient evidence [under the Robison test] to support
the jury's finding that the plaintiff had status as a seaman." 30
McDermott then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which was granted limited to the narrow question of
whether one must aid in the navigation or transportation-function of a
vessel in order to qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act.3 Simply
stated, the Supreme Court limited its review of the case to the question
of whether, as a matter of law, a worker must satisfy the transportation/
navigation function test. The petition for writ of certiorari presented
more complicated formulations of the issue.32
28. 742 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S. Ct.
1180 (1985).
29. 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
30. Wilander, 887 F.2d at 91. (The panel deciding Wilander consisted of Judges Gee,
Garza and Jones; interestingly, two of the judges on the Wilander panel, Judges Gee
and Jones, had filed a special concurring opinion in Barrett, in which they expressed
their own preference for the Johnson rule, and said that if they had been free to, they
would have adopted the Johnson test in the Fifth Circuit. Judge Garza, as a senior judge,
was not in active service and hence did not sit on the en banc court in Barrett).
31. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, cert. granted in part, 110 S. Ct. 3212 (1990).
32. McDermott's petition for writ of certiorari had presented two questions for review,
but the Supreme Court granted review limited to question I presented by the petition.
Questions Presented for Review
I. When a worker is injured on a fixed platform in the Persian Gulf, but claims
status as a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, by alleging connection
to an American-flagged vessel, how is the United States District Court to
determine which of the conflicting definitions of status constitutes American
law, specifically, whether transportation-related employment functions are a pre-
requisite to status under the Act?
II. Did the United States Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, err as a matter of
law, in concluding Respondent, who had only a transitory connection with the
only American vessel in an operating group of vessels, had established sufficient
connexity with that vessel to impose American law on a cause of action arising
from Respondent's work as a painter foreman on an offshore platform in the
Persian Gulf?
SEAMAN STATUS
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN WILANDER
In briefs and argument before the United States Supreme Court,
McDermott advocated the adoption of a transportation/navigation func-
tion test which would have precluded Wilander's coverage under the
Jones Act as a matter of law. A transportation/navigation test confers
Jones Act seaman status only on employees who "perform significant
navigational functions or further the 'transportation function' of the
vessel."3
The Supreme Court opinion stated that certiorari was granted "to
resolve the conflict between the Robison and Johnson tests on the issue
of the transportation/navigation function requirement."14 The Supreme
Court's statement of the issue indicates that the decision in Wilander
is ostensiblylimited to a consideration of the last element of these tests,
as can be seen by a comparison of the two tests set out below.
Robison test Johnson test
1. More or less permanent 1. A vessel in navigation,
assignment or performed 2. More or less permanent
substantial portion of work, connection with the vessel,
AND AND
2. Contributed to the function 3. Contributed to the operation
of the vessel or to the and welfare of the vessel as
accomplishment of its a means of transport on
mission. water.
In other words, as expressed by the Supreme Court, the scope of the
Wilander decision is limited to the last part of the respective status tests.
Having so limited the scope of its review, the Court then began a
recitation of the historical development of the law of seamen, focusing
on the jurisprudential and statutory developments, especially in the con-
text of the longstanding competing forces between the congressional
enactments of the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act and the court decisions interpreting that legislation.
Historical Perspective
The opinion began with a discussion of the state of general maritime
law as it stood at the beginning of the twentieth century with regard
to seamen's remedies. The United States Supreme Court, in The Os-
33. See Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1073.
34. Wilander, III S. Ct. at 810.
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ceola," had reviewed both English and American general maritime law
authorities and affirmed seamen's entitlement to maintenance and cure
benefits and to the warranty of seaworthiness, but had held that the
vessel was not responsible to seamen for negligence of its master or
crew.36 The Jones Act, passed by Congress in 1920, was the second
congressional attempt to create a negligence remedy for seamen., 7 Rea-
soning that the only purpose for the Jones Act was to remove the
jurisprudential bar to a negligence remedy articulated in The Osceola,
the Supreme Court "assume[d] that the Jones Act uses 'seaman' in the
same way.''3 The Court declared that this synonymy is also supported
by its earlier decision in Warner v. Goltra19 The Court then stated that
the Jones Act "adopts without further elaboration the term used in The
Osceola.' ' °
Justice O'Connor then went on to determine who was a seaman
under the general maritime law at the time the Jones Act was passed
in 1920. There follows a discustion of the jurisprudential development
of seaman status under the general maritime law from the middle of
the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century recognizing
that the narrow rule was to limit seaman's status to maritime workers
who "actually navigate." Nevertheless, as noted by Justice O'Connor,
Notwithstanding the aid in navigation doctrine, federal courts
throughout the last century consistently awarded seamen's ben-
efits to those whose work on board ship did not direct the
vessel. Firemen, engineers, carpenters, and cooks all were con-
sidered seamen. 4'
By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, federal courts aban-
doned the navigation test altogether, including in the class of
seamen those who worked on board and maintained allegiance
to the ship, but who performed more specialized functions having
no relation to navigation. 42
Following this review of jurisprudence and of leading maritime
treatises, the Supreme Court concluded that at the time of The Osceola
35. 189 U.S. 158, 23 S. Ct. 483 (1903).
36. See Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 810.
37. The first attempt was in the final provision of the Merchant Marine Act of 1915,
Pub. L. No. 63-302, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915). But the Supreme Court quickly ruled this
inadequate to provide a negligence remedy for seamen in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Company, 247 U.S. 372, 38 S. Ct. 501 (1918).
38. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 811.
39. 293 U.S. 155, 159, 55 S. Ct. 46, 48 (1934).
40. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 811.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 812.
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and the enactment of the Jones Act, general maritime law did not
require seamen to aid in navigation, and that the Jones Act itself created
no such navigation requirement for seaman status. The worker need
only be employed on board a vessel "in furtherance of its purpose.
4
The Supreme Court then noted that it continued to construe "sea-
man" broadly after passage of the Jones Act, holding that a stevedore
was a "seaman" covered under the Act when injured while engaged in
maritime employment.M The Court then reiterated its mistaken suppo-
sition in Haverty that it could not "believe that Congress willingly would
have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the same maritime
duties to vary with the accident of their being employed by a stevedore
rather than by a ship."
4
But Justice O'Connor then declared that:
Congress would, and did, however. Within six months of
the decision in Haverty, Congress passed the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part
2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. The Act provides
recovery for injury to a broad range of land-based maritime
workers, but explicitly excludes from its coverage "a master or
member of a crew of any vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G). This
Court recognized the distinction, albeit belatedly, in Swanson v.
Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045
(1946), concluding that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are
mutually exclusive. The LHWCA provides relief for land-based
maritime workers, and the Jones Act is restricted to "a master
or member of a crew of any vessel": "We must take it that
the effect of these provisions of the [LHWCA] is to confine
the benefits of the Jones Act to the members of the crew of
a vessel plying in navigable waters and to substitute for the right
of recovery recognized by the Haverty case only such rights to
compensation as are given by the [LHWCA]." Id., at 7, 66
S.Ct., at 872. "[M]aster or member of a crew" is a refinement
of the term "seaman" in the Jones Act; it excludes from LHWCA
coverage those properly covered under the Jones Act. Thus, it
is odd but true that the key requirement for Jones Act coverage
now appears in another statute.
With the passage of the LHWCA, Congress established a
clear distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime
43. Id. at 813.
44. Id., referring to International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.
Ct. 19 (1926).
45. Haverty, 272 U.S. at 52, 47 S. Ct. at 19.
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workers. The latter, who owe their allegiance to a vessel and
not solely to a land-based employer, are seamen.46
Thus, the statutory interplay prescribed a distinguishing factor for
the determination of Jones Act seaman status: whether the maritime
worker is a land-based worker or is a sea-based worker. This dichotomy
is derived from a consideration of the statutory development, the stat-
utory language and the congressional intent implicit in the LHWCA of
granting land-based maritime workers remedies similar to those granted
other land-based workers and of excluding land-based workers from
Jones Act coverage. Acknowledging that the Court had nevertheless
continued to treat longshoremen as "seamen" when doing seamen's
work and incurring maritime hazards when it extended the warranty of
seaworthiness to longshoremen in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,41 Justice
O'Connor noted that Sieracki was congressionally overruled by the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA which barred shore-based workers from
an unseaworthiness remedy.48 Justice O'Connor then stated the Court's
next proposition:
Whether under the Jones Act or general maritime law, seamen
do not include land-based workers.
The LHWCA does not change the rule that a seaman need
not aid in navigation .... There is nothing in these cases, or
the LHWCA, to indicate that members of a crew are required
to navigate. The "member of a crew" exception in the LHWCA
overrules Haverty; "master or member of a crew" restates who
a "seaman" under the Jones Act is supposed to be: a sea-based
maritime employee. 49
Having declared an equivalency among the three terms "seaman,"
"member of a crew," and "sea-based maritime employee," Justice
O'Connor then went on to explore the source of the confusion sur-
rounding the navigation requirement.
Recognizing that the source of the circuit conflict resolved in Wil-
ander is the Supreme Court's inconsistent use of a navigation requirement
in its Jones Act decisions throughout the first half of this century, the
Court stated that the inconsistency arose in the period from 1927, when
Congress passed the LHWCA, up until the Supreme Court's decision
in Swanson v. Marra Bros.,SO when the Supreme Court first recognized
"the mutual exclusivity of the LHWCA and the Jones Act." 5 ' The Court
46. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 813.
47. 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
48. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 813.
49. Id. at 814.
50. 328 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 869 (1946).
51. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 815.
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then discussed its ruling in Warner v. Goltra,2 which reasoned that the
master of a vessel must be a "seaman" under the Jones Act. Justice
O'Connor stated that this reasoning "was unnecessary" because "the
answer was to be found in the plain statutory language: 'master or
member of a crew of any vessel."' 3
However, Justice O'Connor stated that "Warner is important for
our purposes because it is the Court's first look at the term 'seaman'
in the Jones Act as it applies to sea-based employees .... There is no
reference to navigation ..... Warner plainly rejected an aid in navigation
requirement under the Jones Act." '54
The Wilander decision ascribed the roots of the navigation confusion
to its decision in South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,55 but
commented that the Court in Bassett was not defining the term "seaman"
under the Jones Act, but was defining "member of a crew" under the
LHWCA
at a time when the Court viewed "seaman" as a broader term
than "member of a crew." The Bassett Court stated explicitly
that it did not equate "member of a crew" under the LHWCA
with "seaman" under the Jones Act .... Bassett did not impose
an aid in navigation requirement for seaman status under the
Jones Act. 6
Again in Norton v. Warner Co.," another "member of a crew"
exception LHWCA case decided before the Court recognized the mutual
exclusivity between the LHWCA and the Jones Act, the Court returned
to the expansive concept of "seamen" as indicating all workers who
labor about the vessel. Nevertheless, Wilander has now clarified that
only crew members are seamen.
The Supreme Court spent little time discussing its Jones Act cases
decided in the late 1950s except to note that they confer seaman status
to a wide variety of workers "whose jobs had not even an indirect
connection to the movement of the vessel." ' Still, Justice O'Connor
noted that these Jones Act cases are "befuddling ... because they tie
'seaman' under the Jones Act to 'member of a crew' under the LHWCA,
while ostensibly retaining the Bassett aid in navigation requirement."1 9
52. 293 U.S. 155, 55 S. Ct. 46 (1934).
53. Wilander, III S. Ct. at 814.
54. Id.
55. 309 U.S. 251, 60 S. Ct. 544 (1940).
56. Wilander, III S. Ct. at 814.
57. 321 U.S. 565, 64 S. Ct. 747 (1944).
58. Wilander, 11I S. Ct. at 816.
59. Id.
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After Butler v. Whiteman, 60 the Supreme Court accepted no more
seaman status cases, "relegating to the lower courts the task of making
some sense of the confusion left in our wake."' "One of the problems
that this Court's Jones Act cases presents is that the sundry jobs per-
formed by the seamen in the cases of the late 1950s will not lie with
any rational conception of aid in navigation." 62
Her examination having discerned no aid in navigation requirement
for seaman status either under the Jones Act or under the general
maritime law, Justice O'Connor firmly rejected the navigation/trans-
portation requirement with the following comment:
[T]he time has come to jettison the aid in navigation language.
That language, which had long been rejected by admiralty courts
under general maritime law, and by this Court in Warner, a
Jones Act case, slipped back,,in through an interpretation of
the LHWCA at a time when the LHWCA had nothing to do
with the Jones Act.63
What she meant to say, however, is that the navigation language
slipped back in the case law "at a time when the Supreme Court believed
that the LHWCA had nothing to do with the Jones Act." Nevertheless,
this decision makes it clear that:
We now recognize that the LHWCA is one of a pair of mutually
exclusive remedial statutes that distinguish between land-based
and sea-based maritime employees. The LHWCA restricted the
definition of "seaman" in the Jones Act only to the extent that
"seaman" had been taken to include land-based employees.
There is no indication in the Jones Act, the LHWCA, or else-
where, that Congress has excluded from Jones Act remedies
those traditional seamen who owe allegiance to a vessel at sea,
but who do not aid in navigation."
In case the reader had not yet recognized the death of Sieracki with
the earlier statement to the effect that "seaman" under the general
maritime law does not include land-based workers, Justice O'Connor
made the demise of Sieracki abundantly clear by citing as authority
Chief Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Sieracki, which distinguished
land-based and sea-based employment and stated that seaman's remedies
arise "out of the status of the seaman and his peculiar relationship to
the vessel." 6 Again citing the dissent in Sieracki, Wilander declared that
60. 356 U.S. 271, 78 S. Ct. 734 (1958).
61. Wilander, I1I S. Ct. at 816.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 817.
65. Id. (quoting Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 104, 66 S. Ct. at 882) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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it is this distinction [namely, the distinction between land-based and sea-
based employment] that Congress recognized in the LHWCA and the
Jones Act."
Justice O'Connor then went on to state that "[this distinction] also
explains why all those with that 'peculiar relationship to the vessel' are
covered under the Jones Act, regardless of the particular job they
perform. ' 6 In this way, the Supreme Court turns away from distinctions
based upon the nature of the worker's particular job duties and declares
that seaman status turns on the maritime worker's peculiar relationship
to the vessel, explaining that:
[w]e believe.the better rule is to define "master or member of
a crew" under the LHWCA, and therefore "seaman" under the
Jones Act, solely in terms of the employee's connection to a
vessel in navigation .... It is not the employee's particular job
that is determinative, but the employee's connection to a vessel. 61
Thus, "the key to seaman status is employment-related connection
to a vessel in navigation." 69 But, having given us the distinguishing
factor of whether the maritime worker is a land-based worker or a sea-
based worker, the Court specified that it was not called upon in Wil-
ander, "to define this connection in all details, but [only] hold[s] that
a necessary element of the connection is that a seaman perform the
work of a vessel." 70
Status: Legal and Factual Issues
. As it had enunciated in its earlier Jones Act cases decided in the
1950s, the Supreme Court reiterated that the inquiry into seaman status
is "of necessity fact-specific," '7' and that the determination [of seaman
status] "will depend on the nature of the vessel and the employee's
precise relation to it,"7 explaining that:
the question of who is a member of a crew and therefore who
is a seaman is better characterized as a mixed question of law
and fact. When the underlying facts are established, and the
rule of law is undisputed, the issue is whether the facts meet
the statutory standard. 7
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 818.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Having provided the "sea-based" factor and perhaps the "nature
of the vessel" as an additional clue,1 4 the Court offered no further
guidelines for the phraseology of the proper legal standard, saying that
It is for the court to define the statutory standard. "Member
of a crew" and "seaman" are statutory terms; their interpre-
tation is a question of law. The jury finds the facts and, in
these cases, applies the legal standard, but the court must not
abdicate its duty to determine if there is a reasonable basis to
support the jury's conclusion. If reasonable persons, applying
the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether the em-
ployee was a "member of a crew," it is a question for the jury.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-251,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511-2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In many
cases, this will be true. The inquiry into seaman status is of
necessity fact-specific; it will depend on the nature of the vessel,
and the employee's precise relation to it. See Desper v. Starved
Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 190, 72 S. Ct. 216, 218, 96
L.Ed. 205 (1952) ("The many cases turning upon the question
whether an individual was a 'seaman' demonstrate that the mat-
ter depends largely on the facts of the particular case and the
activity in which he was engaged at the time of injury"). None-
theless, summary judgment or a directed verdict is mandated
where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one
conclusion. Anderson, supra, at 248, 250-251, 106 S. Ct., at
2510, 2511-2512.
7
5
74. The Supreme Court in Wilander did not address the factors determining what
constitutes a "vessel in navigation" for purposes of determining crew member status under
the Jones Act. The test for seaman status historically has evolved along with technological
advancements which changed the purposes and functions of vessels. See Engerrand &
Bale, Seaman Status Reconsidered, 24 S. Tex. L.J. 431, 433-35 and 472-77 (1983). As
with the advancement from sailing vessels to steamers, the development of special-purpose
vessels such as drilling ships, jack-up barges, submersible and semi-submersible drilling
rigs created essentially a new class of vessels in commerce which operate and function
differently than the traditional vessel plying navigable waters. Consequently, as with earlier
technological advances in vessels, the character of the duties of the workers assigned to
these vessels is distinct from the traditional seaman's duties. Partly because the operation
of these drilling vessels is so different from the operation of traditional vessels, the drilling
vessels give us a most dramatic example of how the navigation-function seaman status
test had outlived the effectiveness it had when it was created in the era of sailing ships
plying the seas. The most recent pronouncements of the Fifth Circuit on the vessel status
question are found in Ellender v. Kiva Const. & Engineering Co., 909 F.2d 803, 806-08
(5th Cir. 1990); Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 292-94 (5th Cir.
1990); Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1990).
75. Wilander, Ill S. Ct. at 818.
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Looking to its decision in Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp. ,76
which held that a handyman on a dredge anchored to shore was a Jones
Act seaman, the Court quoted its statement in Senko that findings by
the jury in Jones Act cases are conclusive if supported by the evidence.
In the Court's own words, "a jury's decision is final if it has a reasonable
basis. '77 The Wilander Court stated that "[w]e are not asked here to
reconsider this rule.... ",78 In this way, the Supreme Court in Wilander
seemed to indicate that in some situations, where the seaman status jury
findings would have legally insufficient evidentiary bases under the Boeing
Co. v. Shipman79 standard, directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict may be appropriate.
In closing, the Supreme Court restated the limited scope of its
decision, even specifying that in Wilander the Supreme Court did not
decide either of the following questions:
Whether there was a reasonable basis for the jury's determination
that Wilander "had a sufficient connection to the GATES TIDE
to be a 'seaman' under the Jones Act ..
and
whether there was a sufficient basis for the jury finding that
Wilander "advanced the function or mission of the GATES
TIDE." 80
Given the limited scope of the Supreme Court decision in Wilander,
the Court has effectively managed to decide the "aid in navigation"
question in a vacuum. The decision is almost a purely legal ruling. It
may be that the Court intentionally limited its consideration to the
abrogation of the navigation/transportation function requirement, in-
tending that its decision could be neatly applied across the board in
Jones Act litigation.
IMPACT OF WILANDER
The immediate practical effect of the Wilander decision is to render
nationwide the Fifth Circuit's last prong of the Robison Jones Act
seaman status test. While the Supreme Court in Wilander did not ex-
pressly adopt the Fifth Circuit's precise seaman status formulation, it
did expressly embrace the last element of the Robison test (namely,
76. 352 U.S. 370, 374, 77 S. Ct. 415, 418 (1957).
77. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 818.
78. Id.
79. 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); See Wallace v. Oceaneering
International, 727 F.2d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1984).
80. Wilander, Ill S. Ct. at 818.
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"contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of
its mission") as an accurate formulation of an essential element of
seaman status. It remains to be seen what effect this decision may have
on the disjunctive first prong of the Robison test-"assigned permanently
to a vessel ... or performed a substantial part of his work on the
vessel .. ."I The Court's reference to "a definite and permanent con-
nection with the vessel ... "82 seems to undercut the viability of Ro-
bison's "substantial part of his work" avenue to Jones Act coverage. 3
Although the Supreme Court decision in Wilander emphasized that
seaman status turns on the employee's connection to the vessel and not
the particular job the worker performs, nothing in Wilander signals a
rejection of the Fifth Circuit's refinement on Robison promulgated in
Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp.84 Given the limited scope of
review granted by the Supreme Court, it can be persuasively argued that
the Supreme Court in Wilander simply did not get to this point because
it limited its consideration to the determination of whether or not a
navigational function requirement was' legally necessary in the Jones Act
seaman status test and did not then go on to define that test.
Moreover, a comparison of the Fifth Circuit opinion in Pizzitolo
with the decision in Wilander reveals that Justice O'Connor followed
the same mode of analysis used by Judge Davis in Pizzitolo. Wilander
and Pizzitolo both discussed the historical developments and focused on
the statutory language and legislative intent underlying the Jones Act
and the LHWCA.
The Supreme Court opinion in Wilander mandates a Jones Act
seaman status formulation consistent in both analysis and result with
the existing Fifth Circuit test which denies seaman status to land-based
workers who have no permanent assignment to a vessel or identifiable
fleet of vessels. At the same time, this test includes within Jones Act
coverage the entire ship's company belonging to a vessel, including those
special purpose vessels engaged in oilfield operations whose crewmembers
have specialized jobs with no navigational or transportational function.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Grant of Certiorari in Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc.
The United States Supreme Court has now decided to review the
principles enunciated in Pizzitolo. On February 25, 1991, six days after
81. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
82. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 817, (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 94
F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir, 1938)).
83. A recent application of the "substantial portion of work" prong in Palmer v.
Fayard Moving & Transportation Corp., 930 F.2d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 1991), does little
to demonstrate its continued utility.
84. 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
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its decision in Wilander, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in South-
west Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni,8s limited to consideration of the following
question:
Are employees who are in occupations specifically covered by
the Longshore Act nonetheless entitled to a jury trial to deter-
mine their status as Jones Act seamen?"
The question selected for review indicates that the Court will directly
address the rule established in Pizzitolo. In Pizzitolo, the Fifth Circuit
ruled that workmen engaged in any of the occupations expressly enu-
merated in the LHWCA17 are unqualifiedly covered by the LHWCA if
they meet the LHWCA situs requirement of having been injured on
navigable waters or an adjoining area." That is, if the plaintiff in a
Jones Act suit is a harbor worker, longshore worker, shipbuilder or
ship repairer, Pizzitolo declares that i is no longer entitled to have his
Jones Act claim considered under the Robison seaman status test of
"substantial part of his work on the vessel" and "duties ... con-
tribute[d] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its
mission... ." Under Pizzitolo, the question of status is analyzed by
determining first whether the worker is engaged in one of the statutorily
enumerated occupations, and, second, whether he meets the situs re-
quirement under 33 U.S.C. section 903(a). If both are present, the Jones
Act claim will be dismissed as a matter of law without ever reaching
the Robison seaman status test.
Case Background in Gizoni
Southwest Marine, Inc., the operator of a ship repair facility in San
Diego, California, owns several floating platforms used in connection
with its ship repair activities. The platforms support workers and equip-
ment used in ship repair. These platforms themselves have no power,
but are towed to various locations by tugboats which position the
85. See Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted,
III S. Ct. i071 (1991).
86. 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
87. 33 'U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988) defines maritime employee as "any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operationis, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-
breaker ......
88. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1988), provides in pertinent part that
compensation shall be payable ... only if the disability or death results from
an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway,
or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).
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platforms alongside vessels under repair, either at berths or in dry dock
at Southwest Marine's shipyard or at the nearby Naval Station.
The plaintiff Byron Gizoni was a rigging foreman employed by
Southwest Marine. As rigging foreman, he worked on floating platforms
supervising other workers and riding the platforms as they were used
to move equipment, materials, supplies and vessel components around
the shipyard on and off the vessels being repaired. Mr. Gizoni was
injured when his foot broke through a wooden sheet covering a hole
in the deck of a platform being used to transport a rudder from the
shipyard to a floating dry dock.
After the accident, Mr. Gizoni initially claimed benefits from South-
west Marine under the LHWCA, then filed suit against Southwest Marine
under the Jones Act alleging that he was a seaman injured by the
negligence of his employer. Southwest Marine filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment asserting: (1) that Gizoni was not a seaman under the
Jones Act and (2) that his claim was barred by the exclusivity provision
of the LHWCA in 33 U.S.C. section 905(a). The district court granted
the motion for summary judgment, ruling as a matter of law that Mr.
Gizoni was not a "seaman" under the Jones Act, but a harbor worker
precluded from recovery under the Jones Act by the exclusive remedy
provision of the LHWCA.
Gizoni appealed the summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit, which
reversed and remanded for jury trial on the Jones Act claim. In its
opinion, the Ninth Circuit applied the navigational function test for
seaman status, the third part of which has been rejected in Wilander,
namely, that (1) the vessel be in navigation, (2) the claimant have a
permanent connection with the vessel, and (3) the claimant be onboard
the vessel primarily to aid in navigation. Following its earlier decision
in Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Services, Inc.,S9 the Ninth Circuit reversed
and ruled that Gizoni's status as a Jones Act seaman was a question
for the jury because there was a dispute between the parties as to
whether he met the three elements of that seaman status test.9
89. 709 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. The Ninth Circuit opinion appears also to have improperly construed the legal
standard for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, in finding an evidentiary basis
sufficient to support a jury verdict that Gizoni was a member of a crew of a vessel in
navigation. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit stated that there is an evidentiary basis for a
seaman status finding when the "parties dispute whether the ship was in navigation or
whether the employee was actually a member of the ship's crew." Gizoni, 909 F.2d at
387. The principle that seaman status is a mixed question of law and fact does not
mandate that the seaman status issue be submitted to a jury each time a disputed seaman
status claim is asserted. Not all factual disputes preclude summary judgment; the factual
dispute must be outcome determinative under applicable law. Holloway v. Pigman, 884
F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1989); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1987).
See also infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
1168 [Vol. 51
SEAMAN STATUS
On the second basis, the exclusivity provision of 33 U.S.C. section
905(a),91 the Ninth Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit92 in rejecting the
notion that any person whose work involves ship repair is necessarily
restricted to coverage under the LHWCA. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit
clearly contravened the express exclusivity provision of the LHWCA and
thereby rejected the principles enunciated in Pizzitolo. The Ninth Circuit
stated that "Gizoni is covered by the LHWCA only if he is not a
seaman." 93
Southwest Marine, Inc. filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, which was granted limited to review of
the question set out above.
Potential Implications of Gizoni
As outlined below, the grant of certiorari in Gizoni is explicitly
designed to review the rule established in Pizzitolo. As can be seen from
the following discussion, when viewed in the context of the jurispru-
dential and statutory development of the seaman status test under the
Jones Act, the counterpoint created by the Pizzitolo and Gizoni cases
reflects the longstanding competing forces between the Congressional
enactments distinguishing land-based and sea-based maritime workers
and the court decisions which had previously expanded Jones Act cov-
erage.Y
Seaman Status in Counterpoint Created By Congress and the Courts
As discussed above, in connection with Wilander, the Jones Act
grants "any seaman" an action for damages at law for personal injury
sustained in the course of his employment. This legislation was expressly
intended to overrule two United States Supreme Court decisions which
held that the vessel was not responsible for negligence of its master or
91. The LHWCA, § 905(a) (1988), expressly provides that "the liability of an employer
[for payment of compensation] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, de-
pendents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death ......
92. In Petersen v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., 784 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1986),
a Jones Act suit brought by a machinist who repaired equipment and machinery on ferries
and who performed most of his work in dry dock, the Sixth Circuit stated: "A plaintiff
is not limited to the remedies available under the LHWCA unless he is unable to show
that a genuine factual issue exists as to whether he was a seaman at the time of his
injury." Id. at 739.
93. Gizoni, 909 F.2d at 389.
94. See generally Engerrand & Bale, Seaman Status Reconsidered, 24 S. Tex. L.J.
431 (1983); Engerrand, Seaman Status Reconstructed, 32 S. Tex. L. Rev. 169 (1991); see
also Beer, Keeping Up with the Jones Act, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 379, 398 (1986).
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crew. 91 The Jones Act does not define the term "seaman," and the
term had been expanded in the court decisions to include any worker
about a vessel.
Around the same time, Congress passed two statutes which were
intended to grant land-based maritime workers remedies under state
compensation statutes. In both instances, the Supreme Court struck down
on constitutional grounds the attempts by Congress to extend coverage
of state compensation statutes to land-based maritime workers injured
on navigable waters. In so doing, the Court suggested that Congress
had the power to enact a federal compensation statute covering these
workers. In 1926 in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,96 the
Supreme Court held that the term "seaman" in the Jones Act included
a longshoreman employed in maritime work on navigable waters who
sued his stevedore employer for the negligence of a co-employee. De-
termined to grant land-based maritime workers remedies similar to those
granted other land-based workers, within six months of the Haverty
decision, Congress passed the LHWCA,97 which also excluded land-based
workers from Jones Act coverage.
The LHWCA provided a compensation remedy for all maritime
workers injured on navigable waters, but expressly excluded "a master
or member of a crew of any vessel." 9 Thus, passage of the LHWCA
in 1927 legislatively amended the Jones Act and restricted the class of
Jones Act seamen to masters or members of a crew of a vessel. This
result was conclusively established by the Supreme Court in the Wilandet'9
decision, and had been stated by the Supreme Court in three earlier
decisions.w
Despite the passage of the LHWCA, both the Supreme Court and
the lower courts continued to expansively define the term "seaman."
95. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 123 S. Ct. 483 (1903); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S. Ct. 501 (1918).
96. 272 U.S. 50, 47 S. Ct. 19 (1926).
97. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3)(G), 903(a) (1988).
99. 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991).
100. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 60 S. Ct. 544 (1940);
Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 869 (1946); Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging
Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 77 S. Ct. 415 (1957). This principle has also been reiterated in a
string of Fifth Circuit decisions: Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp., 812 F.2d 977,
981 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988); Barrett v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Munguia v. Chevron
Company, U.S.A., 768 F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1985); Bouvier v. Krenz, 702 F.2d 89,
91 (5th Cir. 1983); Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 n.2
(5th Cir. 1980); Brown v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 497 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1974); Burns
v. Anchor-Wate Co., 469 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1972); Barrios v. Louisiana Constr.
Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1161 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972); McKie v. Diamond Marine Co.,
204 F.2d 132, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1953).
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Again, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, °10 the Supreme Court held that
a longshoreman was a "seaman" and, as such, was entitled to the
warranty of seaworthiness, stating that "for these purposes, he is, in
short, a seaman because he is doing seaman's work and incurring a
seaman's hazards."' 2 Still determined to treat harbor workers the same
as other land-based workers, Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972
and eliminated the unseaworthiness action for longshoremen, substituting
a negligence action similar to that available to other land-based workers.
The confusion was exacerbated by a series of Supreme Court de-
cisions in the 1940s and 1950s which continued to expand the definition
of "seaman" and which characterized the Jones Act seaman status
question as a factual issue to be resolved by submission to the jury. 03
One case contributing to this confusion which emanated from the Fifth
Circuit was Gianfala v. Texas Co.'°4 In this case, a worker assigned to
a submersible drilling barge who was killed while unloading pipe was
found by the jury to be a Jones Act seaman. The Fifth Circuit reversed
the seaman status verdict because the drilling barge was not in navigation
and the decedent was onboard as a member of a drilling crew and not
as a member of a ship's crew. Without explanation, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the district court
judgment granting Jones Act status. This series of confusing decisions
marked the end of Supreme Court intervention until Wilander, but had
generated an early attempt at synthesis in Offshore Co. v. Robison.05
Offshore Co. v. Robison
Robison was a roughneck permanently assigned to a drilling rig
mounted on a barge resting on the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.
Reviewing the series of Supreme Court cases decided in the 1950s which
had continued to expand seaman status, Judge John Minor Wisdom
found that the "aid in navigation" test had been "watered down until
the words have lost their natural meaning."'0 Following the Supreme
101. 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
102. Id. at 99, 66 S. Ct. at 880.
103. These cases are: Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271, 78 S. Ct. 734 (1958); Grimes
v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252, 78 S. Ct. 687 (1958); Senko v. LaCrosse
Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 77 S. Ct. 415 (1957); Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S.
879, 76 S. Ct. 141 (1955), reh'g denied, 350 U.S. 960, 76 S. Ct. 346 (1956); Desper v.
Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 72 S. Ct. 216 (1952); Norton v. Warner Co.,
321 U.S. 565, 64 S. Ct. 747 (1944); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309
U.S. 251, 60 S. Ct. 544 (1940).
104. 350 U.S. 879, 76 S. Ct. 141 (1955), reh'g denied, 350 U.S. 960, 76 S. Ct. 346
(1956).
105. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
106. Id. at 780.
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Court's emphasis that seaman status was a factual issue to be determined
by the jury, Judge Wisdom adopted the Robison test for Jones Act
seaman status:
there is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go to the
jury: (1) if there is evidence that the injured workman was
assigned permanently to a vessel (including special purpose struc-
tures not usually employed as a means of transport by water
but designed to float on water) or performed a substantial part
of his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in which he
was employed or the duties which he performed contributed to
the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mis-
sion, or to the operation or welfare of the vessel in terms of
its maintenance during its movement or during anchorage for
its future trips.1°7
Under this test, seaman status was no longer limited to members
of the crew of the vessel or to the "ship's company," because a more
or less permanent assignment or connection to the vessel was no longer
required for crew member status. Under the Robison test as originally
formulated, a worker satisfied the vessel-attachment requirement by sim-
ply performing "a substantial part of his work on the vessel." ' " Over
the next 25 years, the Fifth Circuit generally adhered to the Robison
test with minor modifications.
The issue of the status of land-based maritime workers in and around
the harbor and in the shipyard, the issue in contention in both Pizzitolo
and Gizoni, has generated the most confusion in Jones Act seaman
status decisions. Under the Fifth Circuit test, confusion resulted because
the first two prongs of the Robison test, "permanent assignment" and
"substantial work onboard a vessel," are alternative. Hence, ostensibly,
all longshoremen and harbor workers satisfy the Robison test, because
they perform:
a substantial portion of their work on a vessel
and
their duties contribute to the function or mission of the vessel
or its operation and welfare in maintenance during movement
or anchorage for future trips.
The application of the Robison seaman status test to a land-based
harbor worker confers seaman status on every longshoreman who per-
forms substantial work on vessels. The confusion generated by this over-
expansive definition and its application by jurors not versed in the
distinction between longshoremen and seamen resulted in the further
107. Id. at 779.
108. Id.
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expansion of seaman status to cover virtually any worker injured on a
vessel (or floating structure) and encouraged appellate resolution of every
seaman status determination.
In 1986, in Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,109 the Fifth Circuit sat
en banc in an attempt to reduce the uncertainties which had developed
from the application of the Robison test.
Barrett v. Chevron
In Barrett, a sharply divided court clarified the seaman status test
for amphibious oilfield workers whose regular duties require them to
divide their time between vessel and land or vessel and platform.
Barrett was a welder's helper assigned to repair and maintain fixed
platforms offshore. Barrett ate and slept on a fixed offshore platform
called "Mike's Structure." Although all of his work consisted of plat-
form repair, in about 20% to 30% of the platform jobs the lack of
space on the platform itself required the use of a jack-up barge alongside
the platform to provide storage for equipment and materials. The ac-
cident occurred when Barrett's welding crew was performing repairs on
a small fixed structure alongside of which a jack-up barge had been
positioned. Barrett was injured while being transferred by personnel
basket from the crewboat to the jack-up barge and later claimed to
have aggravated that injury on the jack-up barge while lifting a pipe.
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Barrett was
not a member of the crew of the jack-up barge and formulated a seaman
status test for amphibious oilfield workers who claim their seaman status
under the "substantial work" prong of the Robison test by requiring
that the worker's status be determined "in the context of his entire
employment with his current employer." Additionally, in Barrett, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that those workers who do not perform traditional
seaman's duties must perform their duties on a "fleet of vessels." 0
The majority opinion authored by Judge Davis considered "some in-
consistent determinations of status" to be inevitable given its inherently
factual dispute and accurately predicted that "the Supreme Court, which
Robison followed, accepts these inconsistencies."" '
Even with this restriction on the Robison test, traditional long-
shoremen and land-based ship repairmen and harbor workers such as
Gizoni, Wenzel, Simko, Johnson, and Pizzitolo satisfied the Robisoni
Barrett test whenever they worked on an identifiable group of vessels.
For that reason, Barrett did not solve the confusion surrounding workers,
109. 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
110. Id. at 1074.
111. Id.
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land-based or harbor, who perform their duties on and about vessels
which form a fleet. However, Pizzitolo has since solved that problem
within the Fifth Circuit.
Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corporation
A year later in 1987, Judge Davis (who authored the majority opinion
in Barrett), substantially eliminated the confusion generated by appli-
cation of the Robison test to longshoremen and harbor workers in
Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp.1"2
Pizzitolo was employed as an electrician by Electro-Coal, the owner
and operator of a coal terminal and dock on the Mississippi River.
Electro-Coal routinely transfers coal from vessel to vessel and from
vessel to shoreside storage areas. Pizzitolo worked a standard forty-hour
work week and arrived for work each morning at the shore-based
electrical shop where he received assignments from a foreman. Although
75% of his work time was spent maintaining and repairing shore-based
machinery and 25% was spent repairing electrical equipment on the
vessels owned by Electro-Coal, he was repairing one of the conveyors
used to load and unload the vessel when he fell into the river and was
injured.
Pizzitolo filed suit against his employer under the Jones Act and
general maritime law. The issue of Jones Act seaman status was sub-
mitted to the jury, which found seaman status. The district court judge
disagreed with the jury's finding that Pizzitolo was a seaman and granted
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of seaman status.
The Fifth Circuit Pizzitolo opinion, like the Supreme Court decision
in Wilander, rests on the chronology of statutory development under
the Jones Act and the LHWCA. The Pizzitolo decision rests upon the
intent of Congress in passing the LHWCA in 1927, following the passage
of the Jones Act in 1920, and reiterated that:
The 1927 LHWCA, in effect, amended the Jones Act to make
Jones Act benefits available only to maritime workers not cov-
ered by the LHWCA. Harbor workers engaged in occupations
such as longshoring, shipbuilding and ship repairing, who were
injured on navigable water, were the intended beneficiaries of
the 1927 Act. The LHWCA as amended in 1972 expressly covered
workmen engaged in these occupations. In 1972, coverage of
these workmen's activities was extended beyond navigable water
to cover their injuries on adjacent landbased work locations.
Given the explicit coverage of workmen engaged in the enu-
merated occupations, we reject the notion that Congress could
112. 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
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have intended to exclude them from the benefits of the LHWCA
as members of the crew of a vessel." 3 In sum, we hold that
because longshoremen, shipbuilders and ship repairers are en-
gaged in occupations enumerated in the LHWCA, they are un-
qualifiedly covered by that Act if they meet the Act's situs
requirements; coverage of these workmen by the LHWCA ren-
ders them ineligible for consideration as seamen or members of
the crew of a vessel entitled to claim the benefits of the Jones
Act.
The only work Pizzitolo performed aboard vessels was electrical
repair work. Even if he spent a substantial portion of his work
time aboard a recognized fleet of vessels performing electrical
repairs, for reasons stated above he is covered by the LHWCA
and cannot qualify as a seaman within the meaning of the Jones
Act.114
Thus, whenever the 'worker is within a category covered by the
LHWCA and is engaged in any of the occupations enumerated in section
902(3) of the LHWCA, he is unqualifiably covered by the LHWCA if
he meets the LHWCA situs requirement (that is, if he was injured on
navigable waters or an adjoining area under section 903(a)),"1 and
summary judgment dismissing a claim for Jones Act seaman status is
appropriate. Where the worker is in an occupation expressly enumerated
in the LHWCA, the Robison seaman status test is legally irrelevant. In
other words, under Pizzitolo, he is not entitled to the benefit of Robison
analysis. Stated otherwise, if the plaintiff in a Jones Act suit is a harbor
worker, longshore worker, shipbuilder or ship repairer, Pizzitolo declares
that he is no longer entitled to have his Jones Act claim considered
under the Robison seaman status test of "substantial portion of work
aboard a fleet of vessels" and "duties contribute to the function or
mission of vessels."
In the circuits which had followed the now defunct navigational-
function test, confusion still reigned in seaman status cases involving
113. See also Director, O.W.C.P. v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297,
305, 103 S. Ct. 634, 641 (1983) ("The question of Churchill's coverage [under the LHWCA
is an issue of statutory construction and legislative intent.").
114. 812 F.2d at 983.
115. On this point in Pizzitolo, Judge Davis again accurately presages a ruling of the
Supreme Court. This time, the ruling is Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S.
40, 110 S. Ct. 381 (1989) which holds that "maritime employment" within the meaning
of 33 U.S.C. §902(3) expressly includes all of the occupations specified in §902(3), Schwalb
also establishes that if a railroad employee's injuries are covered by the LHWCA, the
LHWCA remedy is exclusive and the railway worker cannot proceed to trial under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60) which grants a negligence remedy
to railroad employees.
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land-based or harbor-based maritime workers because those workers
frequently performed some maneuvering functions in connection with
vessels or floating structures." 6
For example, Gizoni and Wenzel were both ship repairmen, an
occupation enumerated in the LHWCA, and were both injured on
navigable water. In the circuits which followed the navigational-function
test, both Gizoni and Wenzel may have been found to be seamen.
However, under the Pizzitolo rule, both Gizoni and Wenzel meet the
LHWCA situs requirement, are covered by the LHWCA, and thus are
ineligible for consideration of seaman status under the Jones Act." 7 In
other words, before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gizoni, the Fifth
Circuit's Pizzitolo rule had resolved the confusion which had provoked
these concerns created by applying seaman status tests to workers like
Wenzel and Gizoni. As of 1987, the employee and work situation pre-
sented in the Gizoni case no longer presented a problem within the Fifth
Circuit, and summary judgment denial of Jones Act status was proper.
SEAMAN STATUS CAN OFTEN BE DETERMINED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND BY DIRECTED VERDICT
The indiscriminate application of seaman status tests by jurors to
workers who are engaged in those specific occupations enumerated in
section 902(3) of the LHWCA generates an over-expansive class of Jones
Act seamen which includes many land-based ship repairmen, traditional
longshoremen, and harbor workers whose only work on vessels is in
port. Within the Fifth Circuit, the consistent practice prior to Allen v.
Seacoast Products, Inc.,"' of submitting every marginal status issue to
the jury panel served to increase confusion in the Jones Act arena, until
its zenith when two Jones Act cases decided on the same date and on
substantially identical facts yielded contradictory panel results on seaman
status."i9
In Wilander, the Supreme Court characterized the question of seaman
status as a mixed question of law and fact.2 0 Wilander declared that
116. See, e.g., Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, II S. Ct. 1071 (1991); Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Services, Inc., 709 F.2d 1326,
1327 (9th Cir. 1983) (diver-tender engaged in underwater ship repairs may have operated
a SCAMP, a submerged cleaning and maintenance platform); Searcy v. E.T. Slider, Inc.,
679 F.2d 614, 616 (6th Cir. 1982) (night-watchman at sand and gravel business on the
bank of the Ohio River filled gas pumps and placed lanterns on moored barges).
117. Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at 983.
118. 623 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1980).
119. See Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 641 F.2d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1981).
120. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, IlI S. Ct. 807, 818 (1991). See also Holland
v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1976); Keener v. Transworld Drilling
Co., 468 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1972).
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"[ilt is for the court to define the'statutory standard. 'Member of a
crew' and 'seaman' are statutory terms; their interpretation is a question
of law.' 2' In cases where the underlying facts are established, and the
rule of law is undisputed, the only issue is whether the facts meet the
statutory standard. The Pizzitolo rule as a threshold status issue, can
provide an appropriate statutory standard sufficient to support dismissal
on summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or its
state counterpart in cases involving workers engaged in the occupations
enumerated in the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. section 902(3).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judg-
ment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Substantive law identifies which facts are material to the determinative
law for purposes of summary judgment, as only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment; factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. 22 Furthermore, Rule 56
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons
asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate, in the manner
provided by the rule prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have
no factual basis. 2 As explained by the then Justice Rehnquist, "[o]ne
of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think
[Rule 56] should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish*
this purpose." 24
Given the established legal framework surrounding the Jones Act
seaman status rules enunciated in Wilander and in Pizzitolo, the factual
disputes which are material to the seaman status issue have been sig-
nificantly reduced. In many cases, such as Gizoni, the factual disputes
are not material to the determining legal issues, and seaman status can
121. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. at 818.
122. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
123. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
124. Id. at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. See also Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-96, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1.360-61 (1986); St. Amant v. Benoit,
806 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1987); Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian,
Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1986); and Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,
780 F.2d 1190, 1194-97 (5th Cir. 1986), for further clarification of the standards under
Rule 56.
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be decided as a matter of law either on summary judgment or directed
verdict. 125
PROPOSED SEAMAN STATUS TEST
In order to assist the trial courts in determining whether or not
workers such as Gizoni are entitled to a jury trial on their Jones Act
claims, in answering the question accepted for review in Southwest
Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, the Supreme Court should clearly enunciate a
seaman status test. Again, the focus should remain on the language and
congressional intent underlying the LHWCA, 126 as in Wilander, and
125. See Tullos v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 750 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1985); Bernard v.
Binnings Const. Co., 741 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1984). Under the operation of Rule 56,
failure of proof on a necessary element of seaman status renders all other facts immaterial.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The standards for
summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are identical to the standards
for directed verdict at trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict following trial under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). In 1963, after the Supreme Court's seaman
status cases in the 1940s and 1950s, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) was amended
to expressly provide that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the movant's pleadings, but
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). See Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), 28 U.S.C.A. 17-18 (1982). Opponents may not
create a dispute as to a material fact merely by relying on conclusory contrary allegations
or denials. To paraphrase a comment on summary judgment by Judge Alvin B. Rubin:
The [plaintiff] contends that [he] might win a jury verdict. That, of course, is
true. The question for the district court was not, however, whether advocacy
would prevail despite insufficient evidence, but whether the case should even
be submitted to a jury or whether, if it were, a finding in the [plaintiff's] favor
could withstand a motion to set the verdict aside.
Professional Managers, 799 F.2d at 223.
126. The legislative history of the enactment and subsequent amendments to the LHWCA
and the Jones Act spans most of this century. When considering the issues of this statuiory
interface, as was done in Wilander, the Supreme Court should effectuate the express
language of the coverage provisions of the LHWCA within the context of its entire
legislative history. As noted in Director, O.W.C.P. v. Perini North River Associates, 459
U.S. 297, 317, 103 S. Ct. 634, 647 (1983), "The 1972 Amendments were enacted after
Committees in both the House and Senate prepared full Reports that summarized the
general purposes of the legislation and contained an analysis of the changes proposed for
each section. See S.Rep., supra; H.Rep., supra." Both the Senate Report and House
Report accompanying the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA describe the changes to
Section 902(3) in the following terms:
The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a longshoreman or
a ship repairman or builder should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance
of whether the injury occurred on land or over Water. Accordingly, the bill
would amend the Act to provide coverage of longshoremen, harbor workers,
ship repairmen, ship builders, shipbreakers, and other employees engaged in
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should encompass the entire crew of a vessel, but exclude workers who
are not part of that ship's regular company.
The simplest and most reliable seaman status test is to require that
the worker be more or less permanently assigned to a vessel or a fleet
of vessels in navigation and perform the work of such vessel or vessels.
27
Such a seaman status test, after an initial threshold application of the
Pizzitolo rule to eliminate land-based maritime workers and harbor
workers, would create an appropriate class of Jones Act seamen con-
sistent with the statutory interface between the Jones Act and the LHWCA
and would clarify the now cloudy conceptual boundaries of seaman
status. This test would eliminate the confusion surrounding land-based
workers and would comply with congressional intent to restrict Jones
Act coverage to masters and members of the crew of a vessel.12  The
current Fifth Circuit seaman status test (without the "substantial portion
of work on a vessel" element) has evolved to eliminate much of the
confusion which had been created by earlier confusing and conflicting
Supreme Court precedents and had initially occasioned the formulation
of the original Robison test which had expanded Jones Act seaman
status to include many land-based workers who perform a significant
portion of their work on vessels. The refined rule, including Pizzitolo,
best conforms to the statutory schemes.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Gizoni should be reversed
because the opinion is contrary to the legislative development of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act'29 and the Jones
Act'30 and directly contradicts United States Supreme Court precedents,' 3'
maritime employment (excluding masters and members of the crew of a vessel).
Thus, the legislative reports clarify that the statutory exclusion for masters or members
of a crew of a vessel does not properly refer to the enumerated occupations of long-
shoremen, harbor workers, ship repairmen, ship builders, or shipbreakers, but is intended
to refer only to those "other employees engaged in maritime employment." S. Rep. No.
92-1125, at 12-13 (1972); H. Rep. No. 92-1441, at 10-11; U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1972 at 4708.
127. See Wilander, III S. Ct. at 817. Such a seaman status formulation was denom-
inated as the "real test" by Judge Skelly Wright in Perez v. Marine Transport Lines,
160 F. Supp. 853, 855 (E.D. La. 1958).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988).
129. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
130. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988).
131. The Ninth Circuit ruling in Gizoni is also in conflict with the Supreme Court's
decision in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 110 S. Ct. 381 (1989)
holding that railroad employees whose injuries fall within LHWCA coverage are precluded
from bringing negligence actions under the FELA by the exclusivity provisions of 33
U.S.C. § 905(a). The Jones Act simply adopts the FELA remedy for masters and members
of a crew of a vessel. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
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including the recent unanimous decision in McDermott International,
Inc. v. Wilander, defining the term "seaman" and delineating the dis-
tinction between land-based maritime workers covered by the LHWCA
and those relegated to Jones Act remedies. The principles enunciated
by the Ninth Circuit in Gizoni, and in its earlier decision in Wenzel v.
Seaward Marine Services, Inc.'32 contravene the legislative history and
development of the Jones Act and the LHWCA by including land-based
maritime workers and harbor workers within the class of Jones Act
seamen. The Ninth Circuit Gizoni decision, in both result and analysis,
also conflicts with the body of jurisprudence denying seaman status, as
a matter of law, to land-based harbor workers and ship repairmen,' 33
and restricting Jones Act coverage to members of the crew of a vessel
who have more or less permanent attachment to that vessel or fleet of
vessels.'3 4 The Ninth Circuit Gizoni opinion also ignores the principle
that Jones Act status should be determined in the context of the worker's
132. 709 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983).
133. See, for example, Sharp v. Wausau Ins. Companies, 917 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1990)
(welder/pile driver who lived ashore engaged in rebuilding a train bridge over Lake
Pontchartrain); Williams v. Weber Management Services, Inc. 839 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.
1987) (repairman, hired from a pool of temporary workers to repair the drum and brake
assembly of a crane on a moored barge and to hose off its deck); Pizzitolo v. Electro-
Coal Transfer Corp., 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 109, 108 S.
Ct. 1013 (1988) (electrician employed by operator of a coal terminal and dock on the
Mississippi River who lived on shore and worked out of a shore-based electrical shop
maintaining and repairing both shore-based machinery and electrical equipment on vessels
owned by his employer); see also Balfer v. Mayronne Mud & Chemical Co., 762 F.2d
432, 434 (5th Cir. 1985); Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736 F.2d 307 (5th
Cir. 1984); White v. Valley Line Co., 736 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Mississippi
River Grain Elevator Co., 703 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856, 104 S.
Ct. 175 (1983); Bouvier v. Krenz, 702 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1983); Fox v. Taylor Diving
& Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1983); Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d
523 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818, 102 S. Ct. 96 (1981); Cox v. Otis Engineering
Corp., 474 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973); Thomas v. Peterson Marine Serv., Inc., 411 F.2d
592 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006, 90 S. Ct. 562 (1970); Rotolo v. Halliburton
Co., 317 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 852, 84 S. Ct. 11 (1963).
134. Some maritime employees with undisputed maritime duties or navigational func-
tions are not Jones Act seamen because they are not members of the crew of a vessel
and they have no permanent attachment to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. Fontenot
v. AWI, Inc., 923 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1991) (a wireline operator employed by an oilfield
service company who performed wireline services for operators of various oilfield pro-
duction facilities both onshore and in state and federal waters); Ketnor v. Automatic
Power, Inc., 850 F.2d 236, 237-238 (5th Cir. 1988) (a service technician employed to
check and repair lights and horns on oil and gas wells in state territorial waters and in
the Gulf of Mexico); Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1068-1069 (5th
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (welder's helper engaged in maintenance and repair work to offshore
platforms and fixed structures in the Gulf of Mexico who was quartered on a fixed
platform called "Mike's Structure").
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entire employment with his current employer'35 or in view of the nature
and location of his work as a whole.13 6
The Supreme Court should adopt the rule enunciated in Pizzitolo
v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. , which is entirely consistent with the
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Wilander,'3" in restricting the
definition of Jones Act seamen to "members of a crew of a vessel"
in accordance with the expressed legislative intent of the LHWCA and
the Jones Act. Such a seaman status rule, already developed and fine-
tuned by the Fifth Circuit, eliminates confusion surrounding the status
of harbor workers and furthers the purposes and intent underlying the
LHWCA to confine Jones Act coverage to members of a crew of a
vessel. Additionally, this status rule, when considered with the principles
enunciated in Wilander, includes all employees permanently aboard a
vessel and accounts for the technology of special purpose oil field vessels
engaged in operations on navigable waters.
LHWCA coverage operates differently in the oil field and in the
harbor. These distinct circumstances have confounded the formulation
of a general seaman status test which effectuates the congressionally
intended interaction among the Jones Act, the LHWCA, and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),' 3 9 which applies the LHWCA
to workers on fixed platforms or other structures on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf. The OCSLA also expressly excludes masters and members
of a crew of any vessel from its coverage.'14 Considering the legislative
development of the Jones Act, the LHWCA, and the OCSLA, the
PizzitololWilander rule is a valid and reliable seaman status test which
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